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Recognizing and Regulating Home Schooling
in California: Balancing Parental and State
Interests in Education
Paul A. Alarcón*
INTRODUCTION: THE RACHEL L. AND JONATHAN L. DECISIONS
On February 28, 2008, the California Court of Appeal for the
Second Appellate District caused alarm on a national level1 by
ruling that home schooling2 in California is illegal unless the
parent has a teaching credential.3 In reaching this conclusion,
the court of appeal relied almost exclusively on a fifty-five year
old California superior court appellate department case and a
forty-seven year old California court of appeal case.4 Both cases
had held that statutory predecessors to the private school
exemption5 to California’s compulsory school attendance statute6
were inapplicable to home schooling.7
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Chapman University School of Law; B.A. 2007, Thomas
Aquinas College. Prospective Law Clerk to the Honorable J. Leon Holmes, Chief Judge,
United States District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas. I am extremely grateful to
Professor Scott Howe, Professor Carolyn Young, James Harman, and Janeen Steel for
their thoughtful comments and editorial assistance; and to my parents, Mario and
Maureen Alarcón, for their tireless efforts to provide me with the best education possible.
Of course, I thank my wife, Claire Alarcón, for her loving and constant support.
1 Andrea Longbottom, Rude Awakening Court Ruling Alarms Homeschool
Community, THE HOME SCHOOL COURT REPORT, May–Jun. 2008, at 11, (finding that a
mayor, op-ed pieces of almost every major newspaper, the general public, the media,
public school teachers, and people around the world were shocked that “an educational
alternative as solidly established as homeschooling was actually being called illegal”).
2 Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 576 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(“We use the terms ‘home school’ and ‘home schooling’ to refer to full-time education in the
home by a parent or guardian who does not necessarily possess a teaching credential.”).
3 In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77, 79–83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (decertified for
publication). The court discussed “whether parents can legally ‘home school’ their
children” and held, based on two prior cases:
that enrollment and attendance in a public full-time day school is required by
California law for minor children unless (1) the child is enrolled in a private
full-time day school and actually attends that private school, (2) the child is
tutored by a person holding a valid state teaching credential for the grade
being taught, or (3) one of the other few statutory exemptions to compulsory
public school attendance applies to the child.
Id. (citation omitted).
4 Id. at 80–83.
5 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48222 (West 2006).
6 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 2006).
7 People v. Turner, 263 P.2d 685 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1953); In re Shinn, 16
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However, in the fifty years since these decisions, home
schooling has grown explosively from a curiosity on the fringe of
education to a competitive and widely-practiced instructional
form.8 As a result of In re Rachel L., parents wondered if they
would have to leave California to avoid criminal prosecution.9
Home schooling advocates were shocked that an educational
methodology—which had gained universal acceptance throughout
the United States as a legal form of education—could be
effectively outlawed in the country’s most populous state.10
Further, the court of appeal’s decision to settle the general
question of whether “parents can legally ‘home school’ their
children,”11 was particularly surprising since Rachel L. was a
confidential dependency case involving issues unrelated to home
schooling.12 Less than a month later, the Court, perhaps on

Cal. Rptr. 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961). Aside from the private school exemption, the only
exemption to California’s compulsory school attendance statute which could apply to
home schooling is Section 48224 of the California Education Code, the private tutor
exemption. However, this exemption requires the tutor to have a state teaching
credential for the grade being taught and therefore is not applicable to most home
schooling parents. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48224 (West 2006).
8 Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off The Grid: Constitutional Constraints on
Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 124 (2008) (“Home schooling is no longer a ‘fringe’
phenomenon.”) (citations omitted); Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571,
591 n.31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Studies indicate 2.2 percent of the entire student
population of the United States was home schooled in 2003, up from 1.7 percent in
1999.”); U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, The Condition of Education
2005, June 2005, at 32, available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005094.pdf (“In 2003,
the number of home schooled students was 1.1 million, an increase from 850,000 in
1999.”); Patricia M. Lines, U.S. Department of Education, Homeschoolers: Estimating
Numbers and Growth, Spring 1999, at 1, available at http://www.ed.gov/
offices/OERI/SAI/homeschool/homeschoolers.pdf (finding “[a] retroactive estimate done in
1988 suggested 10,000 to 15,000 children received their education at home in the late
1970s” and that “[e]arlier estimates, based on different methodologies, suggested 60,000
to 125,000 school-aged children for the fall of 1983; and 122,000 to 244,000 for fall of 1985;
between 150,000 to 300,000 for fall of 1988”).
9 Longbottom, supra note 1, at 11 (“California member families called HSLDA
[Home School Legal Defense Association], wondering if they should move out of the state,
or when a truant officer would come knocking at their door and demand their children.”).
10 Id. HSLDA President Mike Smith commented:
To say that I was shocked that the court in California ruled that teacher’s
certification was the only legal way to teach a child in California is putting it
mildly . . . . It reminded me of the days when HSLDA began 25 years ago and
teacher’s certification was the ‘sacred cow’ that states were clinging to in an
effort to keep home schooling from becoming a viable option.
Id.
11 In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77, 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (decertified for
publication).
12 Id. at 80 (“A Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was filed on behalf
of three minor children after the eldest of them reported physical and emotional
mistreatment by the children’s father.”).
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account of the overwhelmingly negative reaction to its decision,
depublished its decision and granted a petition for rehearing.13
The court of appeal issued its new decision, Jonathan L. v.
Superior Court, on August 8, 2008.14 While refusing to back
down from its position that no absolute constitutional right to
home school exists,15 the Jonathan L. court held that California’s
private school exemption16 “permit[s] home schooling as a species
of private school education.”17 The court of appeal found the
statutory language of the exemption to be ambiguous with
respect to its applicability to home schooling.18 This allowed the
court of appeal to conclude, based on various legislative acts
relating to the private school exemption, that “[w]hile the
Legislature has never acted to expressly supersede Turner and
Shinn, it has acted as though home schooling is, in fact,
permitted in California.”19 In addition, the Jonathan L. court
found it significant that the Superintendent of Public Instruction,
the Department of Education, the Governor, and the Attorney
General all accepted home schooling as a legal type of private
Finally, the court of appeal stated that its
schooling.20
interpretation of the private school exemption avoided serious
constitutional questions about the validity of a law which renders
home schooling illegal.21
The court of appeal concluded its opinion with the
observation that, “the fact that home schooling is permitted in
California as the result of implicit legislative recognition rather
than explicit legislative action has resulted in a near absence of

13 Jonathan L. v. S.C.L.A., B192878, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 548 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar.
25, 2008). The Jonathan L. court received and considered sixteen amicus briefs from a
wide range of governmental and private parties. Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 571, 577 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
14 Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571.
15 Id. at 592 (“[N]o such absolute right to home school exists.”). Because the court
found that parents do not have an absolute right to home school, it held that a
dependency court may restrict home schooling if necessary to achieve California’s interest
in ensuring a child’s safety. Id. at 592–94. However, the court recognized that grave
constitutional issues regarding parents’ first amendment rights and the right to direct
their children’s upbringing would be raised “[i]f home schools are not permitted in
California unless under the private tutor exemption (requiring the tutor to be
credentialed).” Id. at 591.
16 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48222 (West 2006).
17 Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 576. The Court remanded the case to the
dependency court to consider whether the factual situation before it justified restricting
home schooling because of an overriding governmental interest in the child’s safety. Id. at
594.
18 Id. at 586.
19 Id. at 588–89.
20 Id. at 591.
21 Id.
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objective criteria and oversight for home schooling.”22 The
Jonathan L. court contrasted this lack of oversight with
numerous limitations utilized by other states to regulate home
schooling.23 Consequently, the court of appeal stated that
“additional clarity in this area of the law would be helpful.”24
This Comment focuses on the Jonathan L. court’s plea for
clarity.
First, this Comment proposes that the California
Legislature explicitly legalize home schooling by enacting a new
statutory exemption to California’s compulsory school attendance
statute. Second, it suggests that the government impose two
limitations on home schooling: one which requires parents to file
an annual notice of intent to home school their children, and
another which requires home schooled students to take annual
standardized tests. These requirements will protect California’s
compelling interest in an educated citizenry while minimizing
any imposition upon the parental right to direct the education of
their children.
A perusal of the history of education in America reveals a
general trend toward government control over the education of
The universal adoption of compulsory school
children.25
attendance laws is, perhaps, the clearest reflection of this
tendency.26 The enactment of such laws reflects the principle
that states have a compelling interest in education.27 However,
this trend towards government oversight has its detractors.28
Modern-day home schooling represents one clear educational
form sharply divergent from the general trend towards
government control. This educational form is founded upon a
belief in the supremacy of the parental right to direct the
upbringing and education of their children.29
In the context of home schooling, these two interests—the
governmental and parental—are opposed because home schooling

Id. at 595.
Id. at 595–96 (listing a variety of common limitations imposed on home schooling
in other states).
24 Id.
25 See infra Part I.
26 National Conference of State Legislatures, Compulsory Education: Overview,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/CompulsoryEd.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2010) (“Today,
every state and territory requires children to enroll in public or private education or to be
home-schooled.”).
27 See infra Part II.C.
28 See infra Part I.
29 Rob Reich, Why Home Schooling Should Be Regulated, in HOMESCHOOLING IN
FULL VIEW: A READER 109, 110 (Bruce S. Cooper ed., 2005) (“Home schoolers of all stripes
believe that they alone should decide how their children are educated, and they join
together in order to press for the absence of regulations or the most permissive regulation
possible.”).
22
23
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parents want complete control over their children’s environment
and curriculum, removed from the supervision of public
officials.30 However, governmental oversight of some kind is
necessary to protect the state’s interest in ensuring that students
are receiving an adequate education.31 Without limitations, the
California Constitution’s assertion of a governmental interest in
education becomes meaningless rhetoric, or at least, a mere
desire which the state is unable to enforce.32 On the other hand,
home schooling limitations necessarily impose upon the parental
interest to the degree they limit and direct the parents’ actions.33
Where such limitations unreasonably trample upon the parental
interest in directing the education of their children, courts have
found the restrictions unconstitutional.34 Hence, the question
arises as to what limitations, if any, should be adopted, which
guarantee that each and every home schooled child receives an
adequate education, but which do not unconstitutionally impose
upon the parental interest.
In order to answer this question a consideration of both the
state and parental interests in education is required. According
to the United States Supreme Court, the parents’ interest in
directing the education of their children is a fundamental
constitutional right.35 Whereas, the state interest in an educated
citizenry is a compelling interest in ensuring that students
become economically independent and civically responsible.36
In order to select the most suitable limitations, a review of
restrictions commonly adopted by other states is helpful because

Id.
See infra Part II.A.
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
See Reich, supra note 29.
Jeffery v. O’Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 516, 518 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (finding a private tutor
statute which required the parent to be “properly qualified” and the curriculum
“satisfactory” to be unconstitutionally vague); Mazanec v. N. Judson-San Pierre Sch.
Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1152, 1160 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (finding that parents have the
constitutional right to educate their children in a home environment and that “[i]t is now
doubtful that the requirements of a formally licensed or certified teacher . . . would now
pass constitutional muster”), aff’d, 798 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1986); People v. DeJonge, 501
N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993) (striking down a teacher certification requirement for private
and home schools as unconstitutional); State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 527, 532–33
(Minn. 1985) (finding that a requirement that private and home school teachers have
qualifications “essentially equivalent” to public school teachers is too vague to “serve as a
basis for a criminal conviction,” and therefore an unconstitutional violation of due process
under the 14th Amendment); State v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750, 756 (Wis. 1983) (holding
the state compulsory school attendance statute was “void for vagueness insofar as it fails
to define ‘private school’”); Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154, 159 (Ga. 1983) (holding the
state compulsory school attendance law to be “unconstitutionally vague”).
35 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion). See infra Part
II.B for a discussion of the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.
36 See infra Part II.C.
30
31
32
33
34
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these restrictions are widely accepted as reasonable and effective,
and they have not been struck down as unconstitutional.37
Part I of this Comment summarizes the history of education
in America discussing in particular the emergence of modern
home schooling. Part II considers the conflict between the
governmental and parental interests in education created by
home schooling and provides an in-depth analysis of these
dueling interests. Part III concludes with a proposal for enacting
a home school exemption to California’s compulsory school
attendance statute, a consideration of limitations adopted by
other states, and a proposal for adopting two specific home
schooling restrictions.
I. EDUCATION IN AMERICA: HOME SCHOOLING AND THE TREND
TOWARDS GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT
Since the inception of the United States of America, a
widespread appreciation of the importance of education has
existed.38 In fact, Thomas Jefferson proposed a system of free
schools to be maintained by taxation.39 However, until the public
or common school movement, education was administered locally
and usually privately.40 In the early 1800s, prominent educators
began to successfully advocate the creation of statewide public
school systems.41 Every state had a system of free public schools
Fifty years later the public school movement
by 1850.42
accomplished its objective of mandatory public education for the
elementary level in almost every state.43 Today, every state has
enacted compulsory school attendance statutes.44
Thus, the history of education in the United States is one
which manifests a trend towards institutionalization and
government control.45 However, this trend has always had its
detractors. For example, heavy opposition to publicly controlled
schools came from Roman Catholics who believed that the values
imparted in public schools had unpalatable Protestant biases.46
See infra Part III.B.1.
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC., THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 18, at 48
(15th ed. 2002) (“Several of the Founding Fathers expressed belief in the necessity of
public education . . . .”).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 48–49.
42 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, EDUCATION FREE & COMPULSORY 41 (Ludvig von Mises
Inst. 1999) (1971).
43 Id.
44 See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 26.
45 EDGAR W. KNIGHT, EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 44 (3rd ed. 1951).
46 Carl F. Kaestle, Victory of the Common School Movement: A Turning Point in
American Educational History, in HISTORIANS ON AMERICA 23, 26 (George Clack & Paul
37
38
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In the 1950s, home schooling arose as an alternative to the
public school system.47 At the outset, home schooling was
dominated by liberal and progressive philosophies.48 However,
by the early 1990s, home schooling was predominately
characterized by conservative Christian ideologies.49
Since its emergence, home schooling has experienced
explosive growth throughout the nation. Estimates indicate that
as few as 10,000 to 15,000 students were home schooled in the
late 1970s.50 This number increased dramatically in the 1980s—
such that by the end of that decade an estimated 150,000 to
300,000 students were home schooled in America.51 The 1990s
saw a continuation of this rapid growth and by 1998 estimates
put the number of home schooled children at nearly 1 million.52
The National Center for Education Statistics reports that in 2003
the number of home schooled students had climbed to 1.1
million.53
As public education became universally available, a question
arose regarding whether the states had the power to force every
student to attend public schools and thereby eliminate any
alternate forms of education.54 Given that the public school
movement included objectives such as uniting a widely diverse
population and ensuring competent schooling to all citizens,55
some thought that states had such a power.56 However, in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, the United States Supreme Court
unanimously held that a state act which requires all students to
attend public school without providing an exception for private
forms of education, “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.”57 In stating that “[t]he child is not
Malamud eds., 2007), available at http://www.america.gov/publications/books/historians
onamerica.html.
47 Yuracko, supra note 8, at 125.
48 Id. at 125–26.
49 Id.
50 Lines, supra note 8, at 1 (“A retroactive estimate done in 1988 suggested 10,000 to
15,000 children received their education at home in the late 1970s . . . .”).
51 Id. (“Earlier estimates, based on different methodologies, suggested 60,000 to
125,000 school-aged children for the fall of 1983; and 122,000 to 244,000 for fall of 1985;
between 150,000 to 300,000 for fall of 1988 . . . .”).
52 Id. (“[T]he number could have reached about 1,000,000 children by the 1997–98
school year.”).
53 The Condition of Education 2005, supra note 8, at 32.
54 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 531 (1925) (finding Oregon statute’s
“manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at public schools by normal children,
between eight and sixteen, who have not completed the eighth grade”).
55 ROTHBARD, supra note 42, at 44.
56 Id.; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531.
57 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35. Notably, the Oregon statute provided an exception for
individualized private instruction. Hence the Court’s ruling in Pierce means that the
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the mere creature of the State”58 the Court definitively
determined that the “compulsory” character of the public school
system is far from absolute. Rather, certain exceptions must
exist for alternative forms of education because parents “who
nurture [their child] and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.”59 In later decisions, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the principles laid down in Pierce.60
In summary, since the founding of America, education has
generally progressed toward government oversight and control.
However, forms of education diverging from this general trend
have developed and gained the protection of the Constitution
under Pierce. Home schooling is one such instructional type
which has undergone significant growth during the past few
decades.
II. DUELING INTERESTS: AN ANALYSIS OF PARENTAL AND STATE
INTERESTS AND HOW THEY CONFLICT
If the history of education in the United States reflects a
trend towards governmental oversight,61 the emergence of home
schooling clearly represents a diverging movement towards
The latter adopts, as a
independent parental control.62
fundamental principle, the parents’ interest in directing the
upbringing of their children.63 In the context of home schooling,
this interest inevitably conflicts with the state’s interest in
education.64 The resolution of this conflict depends upon the
character of each interest.
A. Oversight and Control: An Inevitable Conflict between
Parents and the State
In asserting that “[n]o question is raised concerning the
power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools,” the United
States Supreme Court made it clear that Pierce does not
constitute a complete rejection of the idea that the state has an
interest in the education of its citizens which might at times

state cannot assure the rights of parents by merely providing a single, alternative form of
education to public school. Id. at 530 n.* (1925).
58 Id. at 535.
59 Id.
60 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000).
61 See supra Part I.
62 See Reich, supra note 29.
63 See Reich, supra note 29.
64 See infra Part II.A.
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justify interfering with parental decisions regarding education.65
However, the Court warned that this power is not absolute—it
must not unreasonably burden parents’ right to educate their
children.66 Thus, Pierce indicates that both the state and parents
have a valid interest in the education of children.67
Ideally, both of these interests—which have as their object
the promotion of excellence and maturity in the student, in the
one case due to love and a high sense of obligation and in the
other due to civic and economic concerns—will be in perfect
harmony. However, in the context of home schooling, parents
desire absolute control over the educational environment,
completely removed from supervision by public officials.68
Without any governmentally imposed restrictions—including a
basic notice requirement—on home schooling, the state’s interest
in an educated citizenry is rendered unenforceable since the state
cannot determine whether the children are being educated at all,
much less, whether they are being adequately educated.
Therefore, home schooling creates an inevitable conflict between
the parents’ interest in directing their children’s education, free
from any governmental impositions, and the state’s interest in
adopting some kind of home school restrictions which ensure that
home schooled children are adequately educated.
There are three possible solutions to this conflict. First, the
parental interest could completely prevail over the state
interest—resulting in the complete deregulation of home
schooling.69 Second, the state interest could absolutely overcome
the parental interest—rendering home schooling unlawful.70
Third, the two interests could be balanced—preferably by
restrictions that ensure that every home schooled student is
given an adequate education without unreasonably imposing on
the parental interest. The appropriate solution depends on the
legal import of the parental and state interests in education.
Therefore, the answer to the Jonathan L. court’s request for
“additional clarity” requires a consideration of both of these
interests.71

Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
Id. at 535.
67 See infra Part II.B–C.
68 See Reich, supra note 29.
69 See infra note 104 for an example of an organization which supports this
alternative.
70 See infra note 103 for an example of one thinker who supports this possibility.
71 Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
65
66
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B. The Fundamental Constitutional Right of Parents to Direct
the Upbringing of Their Children
Western civilization, with rare exceptions, has always
recognized that parents have a special interest in directing the
upbringing of their children.72 When America was born, no one
dreamed that the government would ever challenge the rights of
fit parents to exercise authority over their children.73 Hence,
there is no express inclusion of parental rights in the
Constitution or Bill of Rights.74 However, the United States
Supreme Court has a long history of recognizing that the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause affords parents a
fundamental constitutional right to direct the upbringing and
education of their children.75
In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court held that parents
have a “fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of” their children.76 The Court stated that
“the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court.”77 Further, the Court cited a
lengthy history of Supreme Court decisional authority supporting
its assertion that the United States Constitution protects the
fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their

72 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
401–02 (1923). The Court discussed Plato’s theory that children should be held in
common without knowing their parents and Sparta’s practice of taking children from
their parents at a young age and found that:
[a]lthough such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great
genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and State were
wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will
be affirmed that any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people
of a State without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Id.
73 Mike Farris, Parental Rights: Why Now is the Time to Act, THE HOME SCHOOL
COURT REPORT, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 6.
Moreover, it was unimaginable that a socialistic state which purported to care
for children over and against fit and willing parents would ever result from the
state and national governments being created in the wake of our separation
from Britain. No one would ever envision a form of government that pitted fit
parents against the state over the right to make decisions concerning their
children.
Id. at 8.
74 Id. at 7.
75 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (finding that the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees parents a fundamental
constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of their children and reciting
an extensive history of United States Supreme Court cases recognizing that this parental
right is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment).
76 Id. at 71; id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
77 Id. at 65 (plurality opinion).
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children.78 Among the cited authority was Wisconsin v. Yoder
wherein the Court stated that “[t]he history and culture of
Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern
for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”79
The Troxel decision also referenced Pierce,80 wherein the Court
found that the parental right to control the education of children
was a constitutional right stating that:
As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution
may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State. The fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.81

Pierce was itself based on the earlier Meyer v. Nebraska decision,
which recognized “the power of parents to control the education
of their own.”82
In summary, the decisional history of the United States
Supreme Court reflects the established principle that parents
have a fundamental right, protected by the Federal Constitution,
to direct the education of their children. However, the state also
has an undeniable interest in the education of its citizens, which
may clash with this parental right.
C. The State Interest in Ensuring that Citizens are
Economically Independent and Civically Responsible
Though the parental interest in directing the education of
children rises to the level of a constitutionally protected
fundamental right, it is not an absolute right. The California
Court of Appeal held as much in its Jonathan L. decision, finding
that no “absolute right to home school exists.”83 Relying on
United States Supreme Court and California Supreme Court
authority, the Jonathan L. court ruled that the parental “right
must yield to state interests in certain circumstances.”84 Thus,
Id. at 65–66.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
80 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
81 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
82 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
83 Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
84 Id. at 592–93 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–34 for the rule that “the power of the
parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation . . . if it
78
79
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the parental right to control the education of their child may be
subjected to reasonable limitations where the state demonstrates
a compelling interest that cannot be protected without the
limitations.85
One such compelling state interest is ensuring that its
citizens are educated.86 The idea that governments have an
interest in education which empowers them to exercise control
over the education of their citizens reaches back to the
foundations of western civilization.87 However, the fundamental
concept of liberty upon which America was founded, and which
remains deeply rooted in its legal traditions and constitutional
heritage, would never allow the government to completely
deprive parents of the control over their children short of
extenuating circumstances.88 Nonetheless, every state does have
an indisputable interest in ensuring that its citizens are
educated.89
But in what does the state’s interest in education consist? A
purview of American jurisprudence reveals that this interest has
two crucial elements—the interest that citizens be civically
responsible, and the public policy interest that citizens become
economically self-sufficient so as not to constitute a societal
burden.

appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child” and In re
Marilyn H., 851 P.2d 826, 833 (Cal. 1993) for the principle that the “welfare of a child is a
compelling state interest that a state has not only a right, but a duty to protect” and
finding that the state has a compelling interest in a child’s safety and therefore may
interfere with parental right to home school where it has been judicially determined that
there is a substantial risk to the child’s safety because the parents have been found to be
abusive and unfit in the dependency court).
85 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he family itself is not
beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. And
neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.”) (citations
removed).
86 Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 596 (stating that California has a “compelling
interest in educating all of its children”); CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion of
knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties
of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401
(“That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its
citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear . . . .”).
87 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401–02.
88 Id. at 402 (finding that entrusting total control of a child to public officials would
do “violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution”); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
89 Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 596 (finding that California has a compelling
interest in educating its citizens). See also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954) (“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.”); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (“No question is raised
concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools . . . .”).
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Undoubtedly, any consideration of California’s interest in
education should begin with an examination of the preeminent
law of California—its Constitution.90 Article 9, Section 1 of the
California Constitution states that, “A general diffusion of
knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of
the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall
encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual,
This
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”91
constitutional language demonstrates that California’s interest
in education is to ensure that its citizens become civically
responsible and thereby capable of preserving “the rights and
liberties of the people.”92
Since the parents’ fundamental right to control the
upbringing and education of their children is protected by the
Federal Constitution, the United States Supreme Court’s
statements regarding a state’s interest in an educated citizenry
are particularly significant. On numerous occasions the Supreme
Court has held that the government’s compelling interest in
education basically consists in ensuring the civic competence and
economic independence of its citizens. In Yoder, the Court
asserted that a state’s compelling interest in education consists
in “prepar[ing] individuals to become self-reliant and selfsufficient participants in society.”93 The Court also spoke of
education as the preparation for “citizens to participate
effectively and intelligently in our open political system.”94 In
Plyler v. Doe, the Court stated that, “education provides the basic
tools by which individuals might lead economically productive
lives to the benefit of us all.”95 In this case, the Court held that a
state is only required to ensure that students are provided with a
minimum level of education so that they are able to lead
“economically productive lives” and maintain “the fabric of our
society.”96 In Pierce, the Court noted that a state has the power
to require “that certain studies plainly essential to good
citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is
manifestly inimical to the public welfare.”97 Thus, according to
the United States Supreme Court, a state’s interest in an
educated citizenry is one which provides the basic competency

90 Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 834 (Cal. 1991) (“The
California Constitution is the supreme law of our state . . . .”).
91 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (emphasis added).
92 Id.
93 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
94 Id.
95 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
96 Id.
97 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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necessary to ensure that students are economically productive as
well as civically active and conscientious citizens.
Further, the California Supreme Court has also focused on
the economic and civic independence of the student in discussing
California’s interest in education.98 In Serrano v. Priest, the
court stated that, in today’s state, education “has two significant
aspects: first, education is a major determinant of an individual’s
chances for economic and social success in our competitive
society; second, education is a unique influence on a child’s
development as a citizen and his participation in political and
community life.”99 Beyond this, other courts have found that a
state’s interest in education is limited to ensuring that students
receive the minimum educational skills necessary to function as
Finally,
economically and civically independent adults.100
scholars have also posited that a state’s interest in education is
limited to two basic types: economic and civic.101
Thus, a state’s interest in education requires educators to
provide students with the basic skills minimally necessary to
become economically productive as well as civically conscientious
citizens. In other words, ‘education’—understood as the object of
a state’s interest—refers to a basic competency in those core
subjects necessary for independent functioning in the democratic
society of America.102
98 Veterans’ Welfare Bd. v. Riley, 208 P. 678, 681 (Cal. 1922) (“It is recognized that
the function of education is to fit the scholar for the problem of every-day life . . . .”); In re
Shinn, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (“A primary purpose of the educational
system is to train school children in good citizenship, patriotism and loyalty to the state
and the nation as a means of protecting the public welfare.”).
99 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255–56 (Cal. 1971).
100 Yuracko, supra note 8, at 155 & n.159 (citing several examples of courts which
have “emphasized the democracy- and citizenship-promoting purposes of the
[constitutional education] clauses as well as their importance for economic prosperity”).
101 Thomas W. Washburne, The Boundaries of Parental Authority: A Response to Rob
Reich of Stanford University, April 22, 2002, http://www.hslda.org/docs/nche/
000010/200204230.asp (“It is well understood from a legal perspective that the
government's compelling interest in education is limited. It has been held numerous
times that the government's interest in education is basically only of two varieties: civic
and economic.”); Rob Reich, Testing the Boundaries of Parental Authority Over Education:
The Case of Homeschooling, in NOMOS XLIII, MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 275, 286
(Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002) (stating that “[f]irst, the state has an interest
in educating children to become able citizens. Second, the state has an interest in
performing a backstop role to the parents in assuring the healthy development of children
into independently functioning adults”); Yuracko, supra note 8, at 138–42 (citing scholars
who argue that the state constitutions and the Federal Constitution impose a duty on
states to ensure that their citizens receive an adequate education in basic skills and an
opportunity for equal citizenship).
102 See Yuracko, supra note 8, at 136 (“[C]ourts have interpreted clauses of every type
as obligating states to establish and operate public schools that provide children with a
basic minimum or adequate education.”). A thorough treatment of the definition of
‘education’ and analysis of what particular skills or subjects constitutes the minimal
education necessary to satisfy the state’s interest is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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In summary, in the context of home schooling, the parental
and state interests are, to a degree, in conflict. The solution to
this conflict depends upon the import of each interest. The
parents’ interest is a fundamental constitutional right to direct
the education of their children. The state interest is a compelling
interest in ensuring that citizens are economically independent
and civically responsible.
III. PROPOSAL: STRIKING THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN
PARENTAL AND STATE INTERESTS IN EDUCATION
As discussed above, two authorities have valid interests in
education—the state in ensuring that children are provided with
an education which makes them civically responsible and
economically independent, and the parents in directing and
controlling the education of their children. Home schooling
presents unique difficulties to the state’s attempt to ensure that
its citizens are receiving adequate education since parents
exercise nearly absolute control over the educational
Simply stated, home schooling creates an
environment.
inevitable conflict between the two interests because the state
must either leave its interest unprotected or impose on the
parental interest. Therefore, the question is, “What method
should the state adopt to protect its interest without
unreasonably imposing on the parents’ right?”
In answering this question, some have proposed that home
schooling be rendered illegal,103 while others have asserted that
the state should refrain from any regulation of home schooling
whatsoever.104 The problem with either of these positions is that
they allow one interest to eliminate the other.105 However, each
interest is a compelling interest which deserves protection.106
Therefore, the best method for resolving the conflict must
balance both interests according to their respective purposes and
importance. Some restrictions should be adopted to protect the
state’s interest. However, to prevent the state from needlessly
trampling parental rights, these restrictions should be limited to
those necessary to ensure that children are receiving the basic
education sufficient to make them economically independent and
civically responsible.

103 Reich, supra note 101, at 298 (“Levinson would presumably rule out
homeschooling as an educational alternative.”).
104 Yuracko, supra note 8, at 127 (finding that HSLDA is committed “to ensuring
parents’ unfettered right to homeschool”).
105 Further, the former proposal would violate the parents’ constitutional rights. See
supra Part II.B.
106 See supra Part II.B–C.
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In order to avoid permitting the imposition of unreasonable
limitations on a fundamental constitutional right, any attempt to
infringe upon the parents’ right to direct the education of their
This
children should be subjected to strict scrutiny.107
heightened level of scrutiny is particularly necessary in cases
involving home schooling since many parents have religious
reasons for home schooling.108 Both a right to educate and a
right to free exercise of religion are at stake for these families.
According to the court of appeal in Jonathan L., to satisfy
the standard of strict scrutiny “a state must establish: (1) that
the law in question is supported by a compelling governmental
interest and; (2) that the law is narrowly tailored to meet that
end.”109 The Jonathan L. court noted that “[a]s an alternative
phrasing of the second element, the statute must represent the
‘least restrictive means’ of achieving the interest.”110 Therefore,
California should adopt home school limitations which utilize the
least restrictive means to protect its interest in education—that
is, restrictions which encroach as little as possible on the parents’
fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children.
107 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would
apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.”); Jonathan L. v. Superior
Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 592–93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that “[i]n light of Troxel,
two California cases have applied strict scrutiny in cases alleging violations of the
parental liberty interest.” Also, that “if a restriction on the right satisfies strict scrutiny,
the restriction is constitutional”) (citations omitted). See also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65,
where the Court found that:
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” We have long
recognized that the Amendment's Due Process Clause, like its Fifth
Amendment counterpart, “guarantees more than fair process.” The Clause also
includes a substantive component that “provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.
(plurality opinion) (citations omitted); id. at 76–77 (Souter, J., concurring) (rejecting
the “State's particular best-interests standard” as too loose a standard which
renders the statute “unconstitutional on its face” since it violates the fundamental
parental constitutional right to direct the upbringing of children).
108 See supra Part II; Yuracko, supra note 8, at 126–27 (finding that modern home
schooling is dominated by a conservative Christian movement); Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 592 (citing prior cases to find that “it has been suggested that when a parental
liberty interest claim is combined with a free exercise claim, strict scrutiny is required”)
(emphasis omitted). Numerous states have enacted legislation which requires state
action to pass strict scrutiny if it substantially burdens parents’ free exercise of religion.
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-571b (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402
(2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.302 (West 2009);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.700 (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (LexisNexis
2006); 51 OKLA. STAT. ANN . tit. 51, § 253 (West 2008); 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2404 (West
Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 (2005); VA.
CODE ANN. § 57-2.02. (2007).
109 Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 593.
110 Id. (quoting Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67,
91 (Cal. 2004)).
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First, this Comment proposes that the California Legislature
legalize home schooling in the state by enacting a statutory
exception to the state’s compulsory school attendance statute.
Second, to adequately protect California’s interest in an educated
citizenry, this Comment suggests that the government adopt two
home schooling limitations: one which requires parents to file an
annual notice of intent to home school and, another which
requires home schooled students to take annual standardized
tests.
A. Enacting a Home Schooling Exemption to California’s
Compulsory School Attendance Statute
The court in Jonathan L. observed that the reason California
has no “objective criteria and oversight for home schooling” rests
in the fact that home schooling “is permitted in California as the
result of implicit legislative recognition rather than explicit
legislative action.”111 The court of appeal noted that home
schooling parents must theoretically adhere to some of the other
requirements of the private school exemption to California’s
compulsory school attendance statute.112 However, the court also
found that, practically, there is no “enforcement mechanism” to
ensure that, beyond filing a private school affidavit, home
schooling parents are complying with the statutory requirements
of the private school exemption.113
Indeed, even though the Jonathan L. court ultimately
concluded that this exemption applies to home schooling, it noted
that past case authority and legislative history appears to
conflict with this ruling.114 To further complicate the issue,

Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 595.
Id. at 595 n.35. The court noted that:
The remaining restrictions on home schooling in California, which are not at
issue in this case, include: (a) home schooling parents must file a private school
affidavit; (b) home schooling parents must be capable of teaching; (c) home
schooling parents must teach in English and shall offer instruction in the
subjects required to be taught in public schools; and (d) home school education
must be a ‘full-time’ school.

111
112

Id.
113 Id. at 596 (“California impliedly allows parents to home school as a private school,
but has provided no enforcement mechanism. As long as the local school district verifies
that a private school affidavit has been filed, there is no provision for further oversight of
a home school.”).
114 Id. at 585–90. The court noted that “two California cases which have addressed
the issue have concluded that a home school cannot constitute a private full-time day
school[,]” and that
[t]he most persuasive interpretation of the legislative history of the original
statutory provisions supports the conclusion that a home school is not a private
school. However, the most logical interpretation of subsequent legislative
enactments and regulatory provisions supports the conclusion that a home
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numerous legislative enactments have created exceptions, for
home schools, to various requirements imposed on traditional
private schools.115 In fact, according to the court of appeal, many
of the restrictions pertaining to private schools “would be absurd
if applied to every home school.”116 Hence, the very legislative
acts upon which the Jonathan L. court based its holding—those
that purport to apply to all private schools but which include
exceptions for home schools—draw out the markedly different
characters of traditional private schools and home schools and
create double standards. Consequently, the regulatory scheme of
the private school exemption makes it virtually impossible for
California to ensure that its interest in education is being
protected in home schools—in part, no doubt, because the
exemption was designed for traditional private schools, not home
schools.117
For these reasons, this Comment proposes first that the
California Legislature adopt a new statutory exemption to the
state’s compulsory school attendance statute which explicitly
permits home schooling in California. The benefit of such an
explicit exemption is manifold. First, any question as to the
validity of home schooling under California law will be put to
rest.118 Second, creating a distinct home schooling exemption will
eliminate the unnecessary legal complexity and confusion
generated by the legislatively created “home school” exceptions to
the numerous regulations and statutes intended to apply to
traditional private schools. That is, the creation of a new
statutory exemption for home schooling will simplify the body of
law relating to California’s compulsory school attendance statute.
Third, and arguably most important, an exemption which
explicitly permits home schooling serves as the basis for adopting
explicit home school restrictions to protect California’s interest in
education.

school can, in fact, fall within the private school exception to the general
compulsory education law.
Id.
Id. at 588–89.
Id. at 589 n.28.
117 Id. at 587–88.
118 See, e.g., In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (decertified for
publication); In re Shinn, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); People v. Turner, 263
P.2d 685 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1953). But see Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 576
(holding that “California statutes permit home schooling as a species of private school
education”).
115
116
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B. Adopting Specific Limitations on Home Schooling in
California
An explicit exemption permitting home schooling is only the
first step which serves as a basis for adopting the restrictions
necessary to protect California’s interest in an educated
citizenry. As discussed above, the government should only adopt
limitations that pass the strict scrutiny test, that is, are the least
restrictive means to protect California’s interest.119 Hence, this
section first considers home school limitations widely used by
other states. Second, it suggests and discusses two home
schooling restrictions; namely, mandatory filing of notice of
intent to home school and standardized testing. Third, this
section concludes with an analysis of the reasons for rejecting the
other commonly adopted limitations.
1. Common Limitations Imposed by Other States
In order to protect their interest in education, other states
have enacted explicit home schooling statutes and imposed
limitations on home schools.120 A summary of the widely used
restrictions is helpful for two reasons. First, the fact that these
restrictions became law indicates that a significant number of
legislators thought they would be effective. Second, that these
limitations have remained law in many states suggests that
experience has bestowed its imprimatur upon them.

See supra Part III.
A majority of the states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes which
expressly apply to home schooling. Further, the rest of the states permit home schooling
under more general statutory exceptions to compulsory school attendance laws. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802 (2004); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 6-15-501 to -508 (2007); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2703A (2007); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 38-202, -205 (LexisNexis 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.41 (West 2005); GA. CODE
ANN. § 20-2-690(c) (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302A-1132(a)(5) (LexisNexis 2006);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 299A.1−299A.10 (West 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:236 (2001);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (2008); MD. CODE ANN, EDUC. § 7-301 (LexisNexis
2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1561(3)(f) (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120A.22
(West 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91(3)(c) (2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 167.031(2) (West
2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102(2)(e) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.700,
392.070 (LexisNexis 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-A:1 to -10 (LexisNexis 2006);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2 to -2.1 (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204(1) (McKinney
2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-563 to -565 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15.1-20-02 to -04,
15.1-23-1 to -19 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04(A)(2) (West 2005); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 339.030, 339.035 (West 2007); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1 (West 2006);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-19-1(a) (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 49-6-3050 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-102(2) (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 11(a)(21), 166b (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 28A.200.010, 28A.225.010 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-1a(c) (LexisNexis
2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 118.15, 118.165(1) (West 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-101,
-102 (2009).
119
120
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The most prevalent restriction enacted requires parents to
file an affidavit of intent to home school with local school board
or county superintendent of schools.121 Nearly half of the states
also require parents to keep records of courses taken, attendance,
or academic progress.122 A significant number of states require
the instructor[s] to meet certain minimum qualifications such as
being “competent” to teach, passing a state or national teaching
test, having a high school diploma or general equivalency
diploma, having a baccalaureate, or having a state teaching
certification.123 About half of the states utilize standardized
testing as a method for ensuring that home schooled students are

121 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-15-503 (2007); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(3)(e) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2704 (2007);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.41 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c) (2009); HAW. ADMIN.
R. § 8-12-4(5) (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.030 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:236.1 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (2008); MD. CODE REGS.
10.01.01.B (2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91(3)(c) (2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 167.042
(West 2000); Mont. Code Ann. § 20-5-109 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.700
(LexisNexis 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-A:5 (LexisNexis 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-1-2.1 (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 100.10 (2008); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-552, -560 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-23-02 (2003); OHIO ADMIN.
CODE § 3301-34-03(A) (2009); OR. ADMIN. R. 581-021-0026(4) (2009); 24 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1327.1 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-27-3 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 49-6-3050(b)(1), (8) (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-102 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 166b (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 28A.200.010(1) (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-1(c) (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 115.30(3) (West 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-102(b) (2009).
122 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(3)(g) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 2704 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.41 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c) (2009);
HAW. ADMIN. R. § 8-12-15 (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-2-20 (West 2008); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 159.040 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (2008); MD.
CODE REGS. 10.01.01.D-E (2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120A.22 (West 2008); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 167.031.2(2)(a) (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-109 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 193-A:6(I) (LexisNexis 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2.1 (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 100.10 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-548, 556 (2007);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-23-05 (2003); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1(e)(1) (West
2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-27-3 (2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050(b)(2) (2009).
123 GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c)(3) (2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 299A.2 (West 2009);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111 (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2.1(C) (2008); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 3204 (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-564 (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-2303 (2003); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3301-34-03(A)(9) (2008); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 131327.1(a) (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-40(1) (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-63050(b)(4), (7) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 28A.225.010 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-(c) (LexisNexis 2008). But see
Mazanec v. N. Judson-San Pierre Sch. Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1152, 1160 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (“It
is now doubtful that the requirements of a formally licensed or certified teacher as there
required would now pass constitutional muster.”); People v. Dejonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 129
(Mich. 1993) (“We hold that the teacher certification requirement is an unconstitutional
violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as applied to families whose
religious convictions prohibit the use of certified instructors.”).
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making adequate progress.124 Finally, a few jurisdictions permit
“home visits” by school officials.125
This Comment proposes that the California Legislature
adopt two of these limitations to provide sufficient oversight and
effective enforcement for protecting California’s interest in an
educated citizenry.
2. Requiring Parents to File an Annual Affidavit of Intent
California should require all home schooling parents to
annually submit an affidavit containing a statement of intent to
home school. This limitation serves the purpose of putting
California on notice as to which children are being educated at
home. Notice is a sine qua non for protecting California’s interest
in education because it allows the government to distinguish
between truant students and home schooling students. Further,
it provides the government with information needed to enforce
the standardized testing restriction. Finally, it provides the
government with statistical information which can be used in
making critical decisions regarding the public school system.
This restriction has been adopted in a majority of states,
indicating nearly universal consensus as to its value in ensuring
a state’s interest in education.126 It is also minimally intrusive
on the parents’ right since it requires a negligible amount of
effort on the part of the parents—they need only provide basic
information once a year to the local school superintendent or
board of education. No less intrusive method could provide
California with notice regarding which children are being home
schooled. Further—inasmuch as it is already required under the
private school exemption—this restriction will not change the
current impositions on home schooling in California.127

124 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-15-504 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(3)(f)
(West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690(c)(7) (2009); HAW. ADMIN. R. § 8-12-18 (2009);
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-31.4 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:236.1 (2001); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120A.22 Subd.11 (West 2008);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-318(5) (LexisNexis 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:6
(LexisNexis 2006); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 100.10 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 115C-549, -564 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15.1-23-09, -11 (2003); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
§ 3301-34-04 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.035(3) to (5) (West 2007); 24 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1327.1(e)(1) (West 2006); S.C. CODE § 59-65-40 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 13-27-3, -7 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050(b)(5) (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
16, § 166b (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254.1(C) (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 28A.200.010 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-1(c)(2)(D) (LexisNexis 2008).
125 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.040 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120A.26 Subd.1
(West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-318(5) (LexisNexis 2007) (granting the Nebraska
State Board of Education the power to adopt regulations including testing and visitation).
126 See supra note 121.
127 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48222 (West 2006).
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3. Requiring Students to Undergo Standardized Testing
Merely requiring an affidavit of intent to home school,
although minimally intrusive, does not adequately protect
California’s interest in an educated citizenry. That is, filing an
affidavit in no way guarantees that children are receiving the
basic education required to become economically independent
and civically conscientious.128 Hence, the government should
enact a second restriction requiring home schooled students to
This limitation enables
take annual standardized tests.129
California to ensure that every home schooled student is making
adequate academic progress since a passing score means that the
student has acquired at least everything that he must know for
the core subjects in his grade level.130 Further, the determination
is made using an impartial methodology—standardized testing.
A standardized testing requirement passes muster under
strict scrutiny.131 It does not infringe upon the parents’ freedom
to direct the child’s education in any way—except to the extent
that the parents must provide the child with minimal
competence in basic, core subjects. Further, the imposition on
the parents’ time is slight since the testing will only be
administered once a year. Additionally, nearly half of the states
have adopted standardized testing as a way of establishing that
home schooling children are making adequate progress.132
Finally, standardized testing is single-handedly sufficient to
ensure adequate academic progress.133
See supra Part II.C.
Although standardized testing satisfies strict scrutiny, the California
Legislature—in recognition of the different circumstances and exigencies of each family—
may choose to include an exception to the requirement of annual standardized testing in
the event that the family and the local school district mutually agree to some other
reasonable method for guaranteeing that the home schooled children are receiving a
minimally adequate education. Such an exception would generate extra costs for the local
school district which would have to analyze and approve an alternative method for
protecting the state’s interest on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, the decision to allow an
alternative method should be left to the discretion of the local school board—the parents
would have no right to require consideration of an alternative method to standardized
testing. For similar reasons, the school board would not have the authority to require
parents, who are in compliance with the standardized testing requirement, to adopt an
alternative method for ensuring the state’s interest in education.
130 Standardized Testing and Reporting Program, http://www.startest.org/cst.html
(last visited Jan. 18, 2010) (stating that California Standards Tests “measure students’
progress toward achieving California’s state-adopted academic content standards, which
describe what students should know and be able to do in each grade and subject tested”).
131 See Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding “the state
has no means less restrictive than its administration of achievement tests to ensure that
its citizens are being properly educated”).
132 See supra Part III.B.1.
133 The California Department of Education should adopt remediation regulations
applicable to cases where a child’s test scores show inadequate progress. Given that
students perform poorly on standardized tests for a wide variety of reasons—not all of
128
129
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4. An Analysis of the Rejected Limitations
In contrast to these two simple limitations, the other
commonly used restrictions, discussed above, either do not as
effectively advance the state interest, or unnecessarily trample
parents’ fundamental constitutional right to direct the education
of their children.134 Clearly, adding any of these restrictions to
the two proposed would violate the least restrictive means prong
of the strict scrutiny standard since these two alone adequately
protect California’s interest in education.
As stated above, many states require parents to keep
detailed records.135 This requirement constitutes a regular, often
daily, imposition on the instructor and therefore is a much more
burdensome method for ensuring that the students are making
adequate progress than the standardized testing requirement.136
Hence, this restriction would probably not pass muster under
strict scrutiny.
which are related to academic ability—the remedial response should not be to
immediately suspend the parents’ right to educate their child at home. Such a draconian
response is probably an unconstitutional violation of the parents’ fundamental rights.
However, some remedial response is necessary if California’s interest in education is to
have any meaningful protection at all. Although a full consideration of the best remedial
regulations is beyond the scope of this Comment, it should be noted that other states use
remedial responses ranging from requiring the child to take another test before the end of
the school year to requiring the child to be evaluated for learning disabilities and having a
certified teacher supervise the child’s progress during the remediation period. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104.5(5) (West 2005) (requiring child to be placed in a
traditional school if child scores at or below the thirteenth percentile and the child’s
scores do not improve upon re-testing using an approved test selected by parents); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 299A.6 (West 2008) (requiring child who scores below the thirtieth percentile
to be placed in a traditional school unless the child receives a better score on a second test
administered before the beginning of the next school year or the director of the
department of education approves a plan of remediation); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-A:6
(LexisNexis 2006) (giving parents one year to bring child’s educational progress up to “a
level commensurate with his ability”); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15.1-23-11 to -13 (2003)
(requiring child to be evaluated for disabilities by a multidisciplinary assessment team, if
child’s scores fall below the thirtieth percentile, and requiring parents to file a plan of
remediation developed in consultation with a certified teacher); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
§§ 3301-34-04, -05 (2009) (requiring parents to submit a remediation plan and quarterly
progress reports if child’s score falls below the twenty-fifth percentile); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 339.035(4) (West 2007) (requiring up to three additional tests, if child’s score is
below the fifteenth percentile and continues to decline, and granting the superintendent
of education the discretion to order the child’s education supervised by a certified teacher
or to place the child in a traditional school for up to twelve months); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 13-27-7 (2004) (allowing school board to refuse to grant a certificate of excuse to home
school for a child who makes “less than satisfactory” academic progress); W. VA. CODE
§ 18-8-1(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring parents to initiate remediation program if
child’s score is below the fiftieth percentile and allowing the superintendent of education
to seek court order denying right to home school if there is clear and convincing evidence
that the child is suffering from educational neglect).
134 See supra Part III.B.1.
135 See supra Part III.B.1.
136 For an example of home schooling regulations requiring parents to maintain
attendance records, see supra note 122.
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Some states require the instructor to have minimum
qualifications such as a teaching certificate or a college degree.137
The teaching certificate requirement is inadequate because it
does not ensure that the parent will actually provide higher
quality education.138 Similarly, a college degree requirement
insufficiently guarantees adequate instruction since merely
having some degree does not assure that the parent can impart
the basic required skills.139
Finally, a few states have procedures for “home visits” by
school officials.140 These visits probably violate strict scrutiny
since parents could submit any information regarding their
instructional format without a highly intrusive home visit.141
In summary, the government should adopt two home
schooling restrictions from those commonly used in other states;
namely, the requirement that parents file an annual notice of
intent to home school and the requirement that home schooled
children take an annual standardized test.
These two
restrictions pass muster under a strict scrutiny analysis and
together assure California’s interest in economically independent
and civically responsible citizens. The government should not
adopt any additional limitations to avoid violating the least
restrictive means prong of the strict scrutiny test.
CONCLUSION
The Jonathan L. court’s decision to overrule its earlier
holding and recognize home schooling as legal in California
demonstrates that home schooling is no longer a fringe curiosity
but has become a socially accepted form of education. However,
as the court of appeal stated, California has no regulatory
scheme which allows the state to guarantee that its interest in
economically independent and civically conscientious citizens is

See supra Part III.B.1.
People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 141 (Mich. 1993) (finding that “empirical
studies disprove a positive correlation between teacher certification and quality
education”).
139 This is also true of other instructor qualification requirements of this type, such as
having a high school diploma or general equivalency diploma.
140 See supra Part III.B.1.
141 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (establishing privacy as an inalienable right
belonging to all people); Brunelle v. Lynn Pub. Sch., 702 N.E.2d 1182, 1184, 1186 (Mass.
1998) (finding that “[w]ith appropriate testing procedures or progress reports, there may
be no need for periodic on-site visits,” viewing a home visit requirement “carefully in light
of constitutional considerations,” and finding that such a requirement “may call into play
issues of family privacy in seeking to keep the home free of unwarranted intrusion”).
137
138
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adequately protected in each home school.142 Hence, under
current California law, the state’s interest in education is put at
risk by home schooling.143 Therefore, the government should
explicitly regulate home schooling. However, parents have a
fundamental constitutional right to direct the upbringing and
education of their children.144 Thus, any attempt to restrict home
schooling must pass muster under judicial strict scrutiny so that
it does not trample this parental right.145
In answer to the Jonathan L. court’s plea for clarity, the
California Legislature should legalize home schooling by enacting
a home schooling exemption to the state’s compulsory school
attendance statute. This new exemption would lay to rest any
question of the validity of home schooling in California.
Moreover, it would simplify the law relating to California’s
compulsory school attendance statute. Finally it would serve as
the basis for adopting restrictions which advance California’s
interest in education.
Additionally, the government should impose two limitations
on home schooling: a filing of annual notice of intent to home
school requirement, and an annual standardized testing
requirement.
The first requirement allows California to
determine which students are truant and which are home
schooled, to enforce the second requirement; and to collect
information regarding education in California. This requirement
clearly passes strict scrutiny since no viable, less intrusive means
exist for informing the state of the parents’ intent to home school.
However, this requirement alone is not sufficient to guarantee
that students are receiving a minimally adequate education.
Therefore, the second restriction enables the state to ensure
that students are receiving an adequate education by testing
their basic competency levels in the core classes required by the
California school system. This limitation passes muster under
strict scrutiny because it does not significantly infringe upon the
parents’ freedom or ability to direct the child’s education and has
been adopted, in some form or another, by nearly half of the
states.146 Further, it guarantees that the child is receiving an
adequate education without requiring further limitations on the
parental right. In contrast, the other restrictions widely used by
142 Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(noting that California lacks “regulatory framework for homeschooling” and stating that
“additional clarity in this area of the law would be helpful”).
143 See supra Part III.A.
144 See supra Part II.B.
145 See supra Part III.
146 See supra Part III.B.1 and 3.
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different states either constitute a greater imposition on parental
rights or do not as effectively protect the state’s interest.147
Finally, there may be pragmatic reasons for California to
place even less restrictive limitations on home schooling than
required by the Federal Constitution. For example, home
schooling’s more individualized focus gives parents greater
flexibility and thereby permits them to adapt the curriculum to
take into account different learning styles of their children.
Further, home schooling allows for experimentation in
educational methodologies in a way which is difficult, if not
impossible, in a large, bureaucratic public education system. 148
Thus, relaxed home schooling regulations may encourage the
variable and experimental aspects of home schooling.149

See supra Part III.B.4.
Such experimentation and improvement may be badly needed since some believe
that the public school system in California is providing an inferior education to many
students. See, e.g., Stanford University School of Education, News Bureau,
http://ed.stanford.edu/suse/news-bureau/displayRecord.php?tablename=press&id=58 (last
visited Jan. 18, 2010) (“California students, parents and community leaders agree:
comprehensive change is needed to fix education system.”).
149 For example, yearly standardized testing may limit the parents’ ability to adopt
alternative educational methods because of the need to ensure that their children are
annually advancing in certain subjects, at a certain rate, so that they can pass the tests.
147
148

